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Abstract—In knowledge processing systems data is gathered
from several sources. After some calculating and processing
steps are taken in the system, a result is finally computed and
may be used for further steps or by other systems. Most of the
time the origin and provenance of input data is not verified.
Using unverified data can cause inconsistencies in processing
and generating output, and could lead to corrupting threats
for the system and the environment as a whole.
We propose an approach where several characterizing values
in a given environment – trust of source, certainty of data,
and importance (of data) in the current processing step – are
used to compute new output characteristics of a knowledge
processing system. These values represent the trustworthiness
and the certainty of the output in multi-step processing systems
based on all used sources and input data. We demonstrate
the application of our approach on simple and advanced
fictitious scenarios as well as on a real world scenario from
the agricultural domain.
Keywords-Certainty; Importance; Knowledge; Knowledge
Processing Systems; Provenance; Security; Trust;

I. I NTRODUCTION
When gathering and processing data in a system, the
quality of data, especially from external sources, cannot be
always ensured. It is always useful to know how trustworthy
the source and how accurate the provided data is. We are
currently developing an approach where values of trust (of
sources) and certainty (of data) are used and processed by
taking into account different importances of various inputs in
the current processing step. The approach does not address
the issue of how to compute trust or certainty of the source,
we assume this step has been addressed before and will be
covered in future work.
In our work we concentrate on knowledge processing in
general, as it usually requires more complex calculations
and processing of the available data and information than
conventional data processing. Our aim is to finally face the
challenges of knowledge processing.
As the reader will notice further below, our approach is
at an early development stage, with many questions still
unanswered.
This paper is structured as follows: Section II offers
definitions for trust, provenance, security, and risk in the
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common area, and gives some insights into related work.
Section III presents our approach for incorporating trust
and certainty into knowledge processing systems – covering
several questions concerning this topic and giving a current overview of our research – and contains the topic of
importance. We put the approach into practice by defining
the scopes of trust, certainty, and importance, and trying
to give some options for further calculation to use these
values in knowledge processing systems. In section IV we
show a short and simple scenario as well as an advanced
scenario by applying the approach on fictitious situations.
Furthermore, we describe a disease pressure model (DPM)
and demonstrate the application of our approach on a real
world example in a current project.
Each scenario is evaluated directly after a calculation.
Summarizing in section V, we provide a complete view on
our developed approach and future development work.
II. R ELATED W ORK
In this section we provide some insights into important
terms which are relevant to our work. These are trust,
provenance, security, and risk of data and information.
Afterwards we show related research publications which are
interesting for our approach.
A. Trust
”In a social context, trust has several connotations. Definitions of trust typically refer to a situation characterized
by the following aspects: One party (trustor) is willing to
rely on the actions of another party (trustee); the situation
is directed to the future. In addition, the trustor (voluntarily
or forcedly) abandons control over the actions performed by
the trustee. As a consequence, the trustor is uncertain about
the outcome of the other’s actions; they can only develop
and evaluate expectations. The uncertainty involves the risk
of failure or harm to the trustor if the trustee will not behave
as desired.” [2]
The meaning of the term ”Trust” always depends on
the specific environment and field of research and application. In a recent publication regarding some researches
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on trust, we state: ”The question of ’How can we trust
anything/anybody?’ is discussed since the beginning of
mankind, but what does this topic mean in context to
today’s technology age and especially for the information
technology?” [15].
Recently, we also raised the issue of trusting in technology, especially in smart home systems, where everybody’s
personal security and safety can be touched in a very
sensitive way.
”Usually, we have a high trust in man-made technology
- from cars to airplanes, from computers and buildings to
space shuttles. As long as they work properly, we most of the
time dont even think about (not) trusting them. Only in case
they stop working in their usual behaviours, the question
of trust comes up. The trust in IT systems is becoming
even more important, as today people rely on IT more than
ever before. Beside the usage of IT in every part of our
lives, special treatment has to be done with the Internet in
this domain. Everybody is online, (most of the time) every
time, and the trust into content from the Internet has to be
handled crucial. When we talk about this, there isnt meant
the information you retrieve or read on websites, much more
the download of files must be taken into account: everybody
trusts into a ”Download Button” by clicking it, but nobody
knows what is really behind this mechanism, when you
download a file on your computer. You make yourself highly
vulnerable, when downloading content from the Internet to
your computer, because you never know, what is really inside
a file (just one example: malware).” [15]
The three main types of applicable trust by Rousseau
et al. [19] are (1) trusting beliefs, (2) trusting intentions,
and (3) trusting behaviours, where these three types are
connected to each other: ”1. Trusting beliefs means a secure
conviction that the other party has favorable attributes (such
as benevolence, integrity, and competence), strong enough
to create trusting intentions. 2. Trusting intentions means a
secure, committed willingness to depend upon, or to become
vulnerable to, the other party in specific ways, strong enough
to create trusting behaviors. 3. Trusting behaviors means
assured actions that demonstrate that one does in fact
depend or rely upon the other party instead of on oneself or
on controls. Trusting behavior is the action manifestation of
willingness to depend. Each of these generic trust types can
be applied to trust in IT. Trusting behavior-IT means that
one securely depends or relies on the technology instead of
trying to control the technology.”
Another point of view is the similarity of trusting people
and trusting technology, especially information technology,
where the main difference is within the application of
trust in the specific area. ”The major difference between
trust in people and trust in IT lies in the applicability of
specific trusting beliefs. People and technologies have both
similar and different attributes, and those similarities and
differences define which trusting beliefs apply. [...] With

trust in people, one trusts a morally capable and volitional
human; with trust in IT, one trusts a human-created artifact
with a limited range of behaviors that lacks both will
and moral agency. [...] Because technology lacks moral
agency, trust in technology necessarily reflects beliefs about
a technologys capability rather than its will or its motives.
[...] Trust in information technology has several interesting
implications. [...] Trust in technology is built the same way
as trust in people.” [16]. We highly recommend reading the
paper ”Trust in Information Technology” from D. Harrison
McKnight [16].
In their work ”Not so different after all: a cross-discipline
view of trust” [19] the authors state that trust is the willingness to be vulnerable, willingness to rely on confident
and positive expectations. ”However, the compositions of
trust are comparable across research and theory confusing
on parties both inside and outside firms and investigate
trust relations from different disciplinary vantage points.”
The authors of [19] sum up that ”Trust is a psychological
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of
another.”
Another very interesting publication about trust in information sources was written by Hertzum et al. [12] in ”Trust
in information sources: seeking information from people,
documents, and virtual agents”. They compare the concept
of trust between people and virtual agents, based on two
empirical studies. The testimonials were software engineers
and users of e-commerce systems. Some relational aspects
concerning trust in the industrial marketing and management
sector can be found in ”Concerning trust and information”
from Denize et al. [11].
B. Provenance
When it comes to trust concerning trusting in data and
trusting the sources of data, the term ”Data Provenance”
must be taken into account. It describes the origin and
complete processing history of any kind of data. A good introduction and overview can be found in ”Data provenance –
the foundation of data quality” [4] and in ”Data Provenance:
Some Basic Issues” [5]: ”We use the term data provenance
to refer to the process of tracing and recording the origins
of data and its movement between databases.” and ”It is an
issue that is certainly broader than computer science, with
legal and ethical aspects.”
Several problems concerning data provenance are covered
in ”Research Problems in Data Provenance” [7].
Trusting the services used and established in a particular information processing and knowledge management
(IPKM) system is highly related to the question of data
provenance (where does ”any” Data/Information/Knowledge
come from?). In particular such a system has to be aware of
the cumulated data of complex communication between services. If there is any communication between services inside
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the system, a security system ensures the trustworthiness of
data. However, the trustworthiness of data from outside the
system can never be fully guaranteed. Since many systems
require external data, minimizing the risk of uncertainty
is key. E.g. weather data should come from external (and
multiple) sensors to ensure correctness of the values and
also legislation information or data from e.g. chemicaldatabases will also come ”from the outside”. Trustworthiness
of sources or the provenance of data differs from source
to source (e.g. values from governmental institutions can
usually be given a higher trust value than from other third
party providers).
Recent research work on provenance can be found in
the following literature: In [21] (”Trust Evaluation Scheme
of Web Data Based on Provenance in Social Semantic
Web Environments”), the authors show a trust evaluation
scheme of web data based on provenance in social semantic
web environments. Castro et al. provide an application for
tracking provenance information in distributed data system
in [6] (”Transparently tracking provenance information in
distributed data systems” - patent).
Zhao et al. [22] (”Research of Data Resource Description
Method oriented Provenance”) and Ram et al. [18] (”A
semantic Foundation for Provenance Management”) provide
more theoretical and conceptual foundations for the usage
and management of provenance.
C. Security
In our context security mainly refers to computer security
(protection of IT systems, information systems, protection
of hard- and software, prevention of undesired intruders,
etc.) and information security. ”Security is the degree of
protection against danger, damage, loss, and crime.” [2]
Concerning the threats when leaving data in the Cloud,
we refer to our past research projects [20] and a related
thesis [13]. The conclusion of this and further papers (like
[8]) is that cloud security cannot be established in the way
as it should be or as we wish, because the responsibility of
security and safety is always the responsibility of the owner
and provider of the cloud services. These are environment
constraints which are unchangeable.
D. Risk
Risk in general addresses the potential of losing something with a special personal value. It is also seen as an
intentional interaction with uncertainty, where the outcome
is hard to predict [2].
Rousseau et al. [19] say that ”Risk is the perceived
probability of loss, as interpreted by a decision maker
[...]. The path-dependent connection between trust and risk
taking arises from a reciprocal relationship: risk creates an
opportunity for trust, which leads to risk taking.”
Relating to information technology or information processing systems, risk can also be categorized as IT risk.

This area of risk is a wide area of possible incidents, where
a loss of values can occur in many different ways.
E. Trust and Certainty in Knowledge Processing
To the best knowledge of the authors, there is no related
work dealing with this topic directly – neither for processing
trust and certainty, nor for the aggregation of (un)certainty.
A good approach for measuring trust is given in ”An
Approach to Evaluate Data Trustworthiness Based on Data
Provenance” [10].
Recent research on modeling uncertainty is given by [14]
and the usage of uncertainty in complex event processing
can be found in [9].
III. S PECIFICATION OF A PPROACH
A. Idea
A convenient approach for incorporating trust and certainty values into knowledge processing systems is currently
being developed. In the next few paragraphs we will explain
the principles of the development. The main subjects in our
approach are:
• any Source (S), which provides information in the
environment; there can be multiple sources in an environment.
1
• any Data (D) , which is provided by one Source; for
our model, every source usually provides one or more
data (elements).
• any Knowledge Processing System (KPS), which processes data from one or more sources; each KPS itself
produces new data as output; in our model, every KPS
produces only one output.
The source provides data in an abstract manner: it is not
important which type of data it is – in our approach it can be
a whole database as well as a single text file or a single data
value. A knowledge processing system is any system using
the provided data from the existing sources, processing it,
and providing new data as output. To have computable and
usable values in our approach, computation of these different
values from existing input data is needed. The main values
in our approach are:
• Trust value (T) of source (S), which defines how
trustable the source is. The system (sources / data /
knowledge processing systems) has to be seen as a
whole environment, hence the trust level for one source
should always be the same.
• Certainty value (C) of data (D), which describes how
reliable, confident or steady the provided data is. In
literature and research work many definitions of believability and certainty in knowledge based systems
exist.
1 In our work we combine the data and information layer referring to
the Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom (DIKW) architecture in [3] from
Russell Lincoln Ackoff, i.e. data has the role of information and belongs
to the information layer.
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•

Importance value (I) of one input data (D), decided by
the current knowledge processing system (KPS) for the
current step of computation. We focus on importance
in subsection III-B.

trust – if the knowledge processing system generates an
output which is used as an input for another knowledge
processing system, a new trust value has to be considered
for this output. This is a non-trivial problem, as it is not
clear how the trustworthiness of your knowledge processing
system should be measured or determined. Is it trustable
because it is operated in a controlled environment? If it is
an internal part of the overall system, it can be assumed to be
a trustable source, but (as seen in figure 2) the initial values
can come from an external source, where the trustworthiness
is not guaranteed.

Figure 1: Introduction to our approach.
We introduced T, C and I and their relevance. Questions
such as ”How to determine a value for trust T for a specific
external source?” or ”How to determine a value for certainty
C for specific input?”, as mentioned before, will not be
answered in this paper, as the values are assumed to be given.
This is due to the early development stage of our approach
as already stated in the introduction. Related research on
measuring trust and certainty are referenced in subsection
II-E.
How the values for T, C, and I are defined and what
their scopes will be, will be decided in a first attempt in
subsection III-C. Answers for ”how the scope of trust T is
determined for a specific source” and ”how the knowledge
processing system decides on importance I for the data”
will also be provided. Many approaches exist in literature
to decide on certainty C, but it remains unclear how to
define a value of certainty for the new approach. Another
open question is the scope of values and if normalization
is needed after calculation. For example, we propose values
between 0 and 1 for certainty C and trust T, probably a
three-step approximation for the importance I (e.g. 0.5 for
unimportant, 1.0 for neutral, and 1.5 for important values).
If the calculated new values (Tnew , Cnew ) reach scopes above
1.0, the values have to be normalized for further usage (e.g.
in a multi-step system, where several knowledge processing
systems are calculating T, C, and I values multiple times).
We also assume, that C and T can both be dependent and
independent, which needs to be defined – see the arrow in
figure 1.
Next, we will discuss the continuation of processing T, C,
and I. If a model of application or calculation is provided,
the new output value of the KPS has to be re-applied on

Figure 2: Details on our approach.
Another open question is how trust values should be
handled in general for internal and external sources. It
also has to be considered that there should always be the
same trust values for the same external/internal source,
however, the possibility that one source gains higher trust
over time does exist (e.g. when the values are continuous
and recognized as stable and certain).
A similar approach for data provenance and measuring
believablity of data can be found in [17]. This, however, does
not cover the usage in knowledge processing or knowledge
based systems.
In subsection III-C the approach will be put into practice
by defining scopes and calculation and answering several of
the open questions.
B. Introducing Importance
In our approach we propose the use of an ”Importance
(I)” factor, which is necessary in order to have different
weights in the current step of calculation in a knowledge
processing system. In this context the question of ”How
does the knowledge processing system decide how important
which input is?” arises. At this time we propose a staggered
allocation of the importance values to avoid the necessity of
normalizing calculated values as will be shown in the next
subsection.
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The importance belongs to one data but is defined by the
KPS for each data separately - see figure 1 - therefore, it is
possible that another KPS decides another importance for the
same data, which will be shown in the provided scenarios
further below. The explanation is the follows: in the KPS
some computations are made with all the input data and the
system itself has to decide about the importance of every
single data in this specific context (assumption: there is only
one main usage of all the input data and one computation
which produces one output: another data D, respectively).
In our approach every KPS has some degree of freedom to
decide how important which data is for the current step of
calculation.
In this context the term ”Importance” could be substituted
with e.g. ”Influence” or something similar. The novelty in
our approach is the usage of this factor to increase the
representativeness of the calculated output. It is not our
intention to feed data through the KPS without getting
representative values.
As the formal definitions and boundaries are not yet specified, the current meaning of importance can be translated to
influence, as the values for trust and certainty might heavily
influence the results in every KPS.
We are now going to make a first attempt of concretizing
the model described above by answering some of the questions and fixing the scopes of possible values as follows:
• Trust T of source S, for each S, has to be greater than
0 and less or equal than 1, where each value of T for
each S has to be the same (if used multiple times) – a
higher value represents higher trust:
0<T ≤1

(1)

Certainty C of data D, for each D, has to be greater
than 0 and less or equal than 1, where each value of C
for each D has to be the same (if used multiple times)
– a higher value represents higher certainty:
0<C≤1

•

Note: For this model it is necessary, that the input values
of T and C are initialized as defined in (1) and (2). We do
not investigate the calculation of T and C, as it is assumed
that this step has been taken before!
We now define the formulas for processing new T and C
values as outcome of a KPS. This is the arithmetical average
of the input T or C weighted with the current I for each D.
n

1X
(Ti ∗ Ii )
n i=1

Tnew =

(2)

Importance I of data D, decided by the KPS, is staggered:
– 0.5 for values which are not very important
– 1.0 for regular values, where no special impact on
importance is given
– 1.5 for very important values, concerning the current data processing
I = 0.5 | 1 | 1.5

(3)

Note: Regarding the current step of processing in the
KPS for example: if data Di is given the importance 1.5,
there also has to be another data Dj with an importance
of 0.5. There always has to be the same number of

(4)

Formula 4: Calculating Tnew over all T1-n related to I1-n .
n

1X
(Ci ∗ Ii )
n i=1

Cnew =

C. Scopes & Calculation

•

importance weighted D with 0.5 and with 1.5. The
importance of 1.0, in fact, does not affect the current
step of processing. This constraint guarantees avoiding
an overestimation of grading input data too often as
”very important”, which would result in a deferral of
representation of the output values. It also guarantees,
that all calculated output values (Tnew and Cnew ) stay in
the scope between 0 and 1, resulting in the effect that
no normalization is needed within the current scope of
calculations.

(5)

Formula 5: Calculating Cnew over all C1-n related to I1-n .
D. Alternative Aggregation Functions
We have discussed several other methods to calculate
Tnew and Cnew in our research. For example the following
functions are also possible for calculation: (Note: in the
equations 6-11, Tnew and Ti can always be substituted with
Cnew and Ci to get the corresponding formulas, as our current
intention is to compute Tnew and Cnew in the same manner).
n

Tnew =

Tnew =

1X
Ti
n i=1

n
X

(6)

(Ti ∗ Ii )

(7)

i=1
n

Tnew =

1 Y (Ti + Ii )
n i=1
2

(8)

n

Tnew =

Tnew =

1Y
Ti
n i=1

(9)

n
Y
(Ti + Ii )

(10)

2

i=1

Tnew = min(Ti )

(11)

n

For now, we use the aggregation functions 4 and 5 in the
following sections, for our first approach.
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IV. S CENARIOS
A. Simple Scenario
The following example relies on the provided model and
formulas in section III-C. We introduce four sources (S1 to
S4 ) with different trust values (T1 to T4 ), each providing
one data (D1 to D4 ) with different certainty values (C1 to
C4 ) for one knowledge processing system (KPSA ), which
emphasizes the different importances (I1 to I4 ). The values
are listed in table I as follows:
Table I: Initial values of T, C & I for a simple scenario.
S1 : T1 =0.8
D1 : C1 =0.9
KPSA : I1 =1.0
S2 : T2 =0.4
D2 : C2 =0.2
KPSA : I2 =1.5
S3 : T3 =0.9
D3 : C3 =0.2
KPSA : I3 =0.5
S4 : T4 =0.2
D4 : C4 =0.7
KPSA : I4 =1.0

its low importance in the current processing step, it does
not affect the result that much (in fact, only 1/3 as much
as S2 does). The remaining trust values from S1 and S3
have a medium impact, as their weighted value is 0.5. The
same argumentation is valid for the certainty values C in this
scenario. This is the reason for the very average outcome
of Tnew = 0.5125 and Cnew = 0.5. If you transfer the final
results into a range of [0..100] (or percentage values), you
can interpret them with Tnew = 51.25% and Cnew = 50.0%
which can be seen as a good representative view on the
whole systems’ trust and certainty outcome.
We know that an application of our model in such a small
use case shown here is only the representation of a simple
reality. Most of the time, various processing steps occur in
multiple knowledge processing systems. We demonstrate a
more realistic example in the next subsection.
B. Advanced Scenario

Figure 3: Simple Test Scenario.
The application of the formulas 4 and 5 are leading to the
following results:
0.8 ∗ 1 + 0.4 ∗ 1.5 + 0.9 ∗ 0.5 + 0.2 ∗ 1
=
4
(12)
2.05
= 0.5125
=
4

Tnew =

0.9 ∗ 1 + 0.2 ∗ 1.5 + 0.2 ∗ 0.5 + 0.7 ∗ 1
=
4
(13)
2
= = 0.5
4
As seen in figure 3 and in the calculation above, the
outcome of Tnew and Cnew are very representative, regarding
the input values, which were well balanced on purpose (the
mixture of T and C values was chosen in a way, where all
possible situations are represented with four inputs: high/low
T with high/low C and each reversed).

For our advanced scenario, we are introducing six sources
(S1 to S6 ) with different trust values (T1 to T6 ), each
providing one or two data (D11 , D12 , D2 , D31 , D32 , D4 ,
D51 , D52 , and D6 ) with different certainty values (C11 , C12 ,
C2 , C31 , C32 , C4 , C51 , C52 , and C6 ) for multiple knowledge
processing systems (KPSA to KPSE ), which weight the
different importances.
KPSA-C are working only with data from sources S1-6 , so
the T and C values are given. KPSD is working with data
from source S1 and KPSA,B and KPSE is processing only
output values from KPSB,C,D (no initial sources) – therefore,
the calculation of T and C of KPSD and KPSE depend on the
calculations of KPSA,B,C , because they receive (most of) their
input T and C values from previous processing steps. An
overview of the advanced scenario including the calculated
values is shown in figure 4 at the end of this section. The
values for the first calculation step are listed in table II as
follows:
An overview of the advanced scenario is shown in figure
4.

Cnew =

Evaluation of Simple Scenario: The most impact on
the final score was caused by S2 due to its weighting by
I2 =1.5 – both T and C values from this source are very low
(0.4 and 0.2), which affects the final score in a meaningful
way. The highest trust is provided by S3 , but because of

Figure 4: Advanced Test Scenario.
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Table II: Initial values of T, C & I for an advanced scenario.
S1 : T1 =1.0
D11 : C11 =0.9
KPSA : IA1 =0.5
S2 : T2 =0.4
D2 : C2 =0.3
KPSA : IA2 =1.0
S3 : T3 =0.8
D31 : C31 =0.8
KPSA : IA3 =1.5
D32 : C32 =0.5
KPSB : IB1 =1.0
S4 : T4 =0.2
D4 : C4 =0.2
KPSB : IB2 =1.5
S5 : T5 =0.5
D51 : C51 =1.0
KPSB : IB3 =0.5
D52 : C52 =0.7
KPSC : IC1 =1.0
S6 : T6 =0.9
D6 : C6 =1.0
KPSC : IC2 =1.0
Due to the fictional character of this scenario (with no
detailed information about the involved knowledge processing systems), all values are chosen freely. Particularly the
importance values are picked in a way to demonstrate the
practicality as much as possible.
With these input values, we are able to compute trust and
certainty values for the output data of KPSA-C in a first step
with the formulas 4 and 5, similar to the simple scenario in
the previous section:
TA =

2.1
1 ∗ 0.5 + 0.4 ∗ 1 + 0.8 ∗ 1.5
=
= 0.7
3
3

(14)

CA =

1.95
0.9 ∗ 0.5 + 0.3 ∗ 1 + 0.8 ∗ 1.5
=
= 0.65 (15)
3
3

TB =

0.8 ∗ 1 + 0.2 ∗ 1.5 + 0.5 ∗ 0.5
1.35
=
= 0.45 (16)
3
3

CB =

0.5 ∗ 1 + 0.2 ∗ 1.5 + 1 ∗ 0.5
1.05
=
= 0.35 (17)
3
3
TC =

1.4
0.5 ∗ 1 + 0.9 ∗ 1
=
= 0.7
2
2

(18)

0.7 ∗ 1 + 1 ∗ 1
1.7
=
= 0.85
(19)
2
2
To provide a structured way of progress, we accumulate
the calculated values in table III, for the ongoing process
of calculating the output of KPSD and KPSE . Note, that
KPSA , KPSB , and KPSC act as new/additional sources for
the ongoing calculations.
CC =

Table III: Calculated values and initial values for processing
output of KPSD .
S1 : T1 =1.0
D12 : C12 =0.80
KPSD : ID1 =0.5
KPSA : TA =0.7
DA : CA =0.65
KPSD : ID2 =1.0
KPSB : TB =0.45
DB : CB =0.35
KPSD : ID3 =1.5
With these calculations, we can now continue finding the
values for KPSD .
TD =

1 ∗ 0.5 + 0.7 ∗ 1 + 0.45 ∗ 1.5
1.875
=
= 0.625
3
3
(20)

0.8 ∗ 0.5 + 0.65 ∗ 1 + 0.35 ∗ 1.5
1.575
=
= 0.525
3
3
(21)
The important values for calculating the output of KPSE are
shown in table IV:
CD =

Table IV: Values for final processing step.
KPSC : TC =0.70
DC : CC =0.85
KPSE : IE1 =1.0
KPSD : TD =0.625 DD : CD =0.525
KPSE : IE2 =1.0
With these calculated values, we can now proceed finishing the scenario by computing the values for KPSD and
KPSE , where KPSE generates the final output values of this
scenario.
TE =

0.625 ∗ 1 + 0.7 ∗ 1
1.325
=
= 0.6625
2
2

(22)

CE =

0.525 ∗ 1 + 0.85 ∗ 1
1.375
=
= 0.6875
2
2

(23)

Evaluation of Advanced Scenario: The results of this
advanced scenario are:
• Trust TE of KPSE is computed with 0.6625
• Certainty CE of DE is computed with 0.6875
Here the sources S3 and S4 have the highest impact in the
whole calculation concerning trust, because of their high
importance in KPSA and KPSB as well as in the further
calculation step in KPSD . Concerning certainty, the low
value of C4 =0.2 has high influence in this model, as its
importance is rated with 1.5.
If you transfer the final results into a range of [0..100] (or
percentage values), you can interpret them with TE = 66.25%
and CE = 68.75% which can be seen as a good representation
of the whole systems’ trust and certainty outcome, similar
to the outcome in the simple scenario.
C. Scenario in the Agricultural Domain
1) Disease Pressure Model: We are now referring to
the DPM (Disease Pressure Model, used in the Project
CLAFIS [1]) for calculating an accurate daily risk value.
This shows how certain a specific disease outbreak for a
specific agricultural field can be. The DPM is provided in
figure 5, together with an explanation of the single parts and
a description of the used functions.
The DPM uses input values from a FMIS (farm management information system), which stores information such
as this year’s and last year’s crop as well as the used
tillage method. The needed weather data comes from several
weather stations, which gathers information such as temperature, relative humidity, amount of rainfall, and wind speed
is gathered.
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0.85 + 0.8
= 0.825
(28)
2
Having finished the the calculation of trust and certainty of
FBase, F4, F6, and F5, we are now able to continue the
scenario.
TF B = 1

CDF B =

Table VII: Values for calculating the outcome of FDaily.
TFB =1
TF4 =0.9
TF6 =0.9
TF5 =0.8

2) Application of our approach on DPM: We now apply
our approach on the model of DPM. The whole process of
calculation can be seen in figure 6. The initial values for the
first steps of calculation are listed in table V.
Table V: Initial values of T, C and I for calculating F1, F2,
F4, F5, and F6.
CCp =0.8
CTi =0.9
CCs =0.8
CT =0.9

TWeatherStation1 =0.9

F1:
F1:
F2:
F4:
F6:
F5:
F4:
F6:
F5:
F5:
F4:

CRh =0.8

TWeatherStation2 =0.7

CR =0.7
CWs =0.8

IF1-Cp =1
IF1-Ti =1
IF2-Cs =1
IF4-T =0.5
IF6-T =0.5
IF5-T =1
IF4-Rh =1.5
IF6-Rh =0.5
IF5-Rh =1
IF5-R =0.5
IF5-Ws =1.5

The application of the formulas 4 and 5 are leading to
the following results of trust (TF1 , TF2 , TF4 , TF5 , TF6 ) and
certainty (CDF1 , CDF2 , CDF4 , CDF5 , CDF6 ):
TF 1 = 1
CDF 1 = 0.85
TF 4 = 0.9
CDF 4 = 0.825

TF 2 = 1

(24)

CDF 2 = 0.8

(25)

TF 6 = 0.9

CDF 6 = 0.875

TF 5 = 0.8

(26)

CDF 5 = 0.8125 (27)

In order to process the final calculations we have to
compute the outcome of FBase first. The needed input values
for FBase are listed in table VI.
Table VI: Values for calculating the outcome of FBase.
TF1 =1
TF2 =1

CDF1 =0.85
CDF2 =0.8

FD:
FD:
FD:
FD:

IFD-DFB =1.5
IFD-DF4 =1
IFD-DF6 =1
IFD-DF5 =0.5

With the calculated values, we can now finish the scenario
by measuring the outcome of trust TFD and certainty CDFD
of the function FDaily. The needed values for calculating
FDaily are listed in table VII.

Figure 5: Disease Pressure Model (DPM).

TFMIS =1

CDFB =0.825
CDF4 =0.825
CDF6 =0.875
CDF5 =0.8125

FB: IFB-DF1 =1
FB: IFB-DF2 =1

1.5 ∗ 1 + 0.9 ∗ 1 + 0.9 ∗ 1 + 0.5 ∗ 0.8
=
4
3.7
= 0.925
=
4

TF D =

(29)

1.5 ∗ 0.825 + 0.825 ∗ 1 + 0.875 ∗ 1 + 0.5 ∗ 0.8
=
4
3.34375
=
= 0.8359375 = 0.836
4
(30)

CDF D =

Evaluation of DPM Scenario: The DPM model is
a good example for our approach, as the sources (FMIS
and Weather Stations) are ”under our control”. This
means, that these sources are highly trustable (TFMIS =1,
TWeatherStation1 =0.9, TWeatherStation2 =0.7 – the chosen trust value
of TWeatherStation2 causes a better variation in our model – in
fact, it would be similarly high as TWeatherStation1 in reality).
The provided data is very likely to be accurate as it is
entered into the FMIS by the person who controls the system
(often the farmer himself). The data provided by the weather
stations can also be assumed to be accurate.
The most important step in the calculation of the DPM is
the provision of the base risk where the outcome of FBase is
very useful for further calculations: TFB stays on the highest
possible value 1 and the certainty of CDFB =0.825 is also a
very good indicator for FDaily. Particularly because of the
importance of FBase in FDaily IFD-DFB =1.5, its affection is
quite high on the last step of calculation.
With the outcome of FDaily with TFD =0.925 and the
certainty CDFD =0.836 of FDaily’s produced output DFD , we
can sum up, that the DPM is producing quite trustable and
certain values. If you transfer the final results into a range of
[0..100] (or percentage values), you can interpret them with
TFD =92.5% and CDFD =83.6%. These can be considered to
be good values for trust and certainty.
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Figure 6: Approach applied on disease pressure model (DPM).

Some parts of the graphic above (figure 6) are marked
in light grey: the values of function F3, are the same as
the output of FDaily, would be included as an input for the
calculation of FDaily itself. As recursion is not yet covered
in our approach, we do not consider the function F3 in this
work and in the calculation of trust and certainty values in
the DPM. However, we will consider recursion in further
research work, therefore improving our approach.
V. S UMMARY & O UTLOOK
We addressed the question of how to determine trust- and
certainty-values of a KPS output, when different trust- and
certainty-values are given for the input data.
We provided a first solution on a simple and advanced
example as well as on a real world scenario, the disease
pressure model (DPM). The results are realistic and the
computed values are promising.
Further steps such as analyzing runtime-complexity, proof
of non-converging, evaluation of usage of the approach, experiments and testing the approach on several more realistic
multi-step scenarios, and their evaluation will be done in
further work. Additionally, we will evaluate of more complex aggregation functions, hereby incorporating statistical
distributions of trust and certainty values. Moreover, we
will consider recursion in our approach and dealing with
questions like ”Is staggering of Importance (I) needed?” and
”Are T and C (in)dependent?”.

A philosophical element has to be discussed too: ”Are we
allowed to alter a trust value according to its importance?”.
Interpreting and calling it an influence would probably
be less controversial. However, it does not eliminate the
underlying aspect and the much needed discussion.
The implications for research can be expected as stated
in section II-E. There are no other developed approaches
concerning the processing of trust and certainty, neither
for their aggregation. As soon as the development of the
approach has been completed, it will cover the entire lifemanagement of trust and certainty in a system. Therefore,
the system output can be assessed much better. Its novelty
and innovation will have a profound impact on further
research in this area.
Our aim is to develop a complete model for calculating
representative values in KPS by incorporating trust, certainty
and importance values. This approach can then be applied
to all other processing systems as well. Such a system,
which can be applied to a variety of applications, would
be incredibly useful in practice.
In further research stages, we will take the semantic
foundation of provenance management (related to Ram et
al. [18], (W7 - What, How, Where, When, Who, Which,
and Why of data and its history)) into account and will
cover the origin of data and the measurement, definition,
determination and grading of trust and certainty.
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[13] Markus Jäger. Sicherheitsaspekte bei Virtualisierungen. Master’s Thesis, 7 2014.
[14] Alexander Karlsson, Björn Hammarfelt, H. Joe Steinhauer,
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